A kinder, gentler nativism?: Review of Alison Gopnik, \u3ci\u3eThe philosophical baby\u3c/i\u3e by Moshman, David
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Educational Psychology Papers and 
Publications Educational Psychology, Department of 
9-2011 
A kinder, gentler nativism?: Review of Alison Gopnik, The 
philosophical baby 
David Moshman 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, dmoshman1@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/edpsychpapers 
 Part of the Child Psychology Commons, Cognitive Psychology Commons, Developmental Psychology 
Commons, and the School Psychology Commons 
Moshman, David, "A kinder, gentler nativism?: Review of Alison Gopnik, The philosophical baby" (2011). 
Educational Psychology Papers and Publications. 304. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/edpsychpapers/304 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Educational Psychology, Department of at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Educational Psychology 
Papers and Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
1
Book review 
A kinder, gentler nativism? 
Alison Gopnik, The philosophical baby: What children’s 
minds tell us about truth, love, and the meaning of life. 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York, 2009,  
ISBN: 978-0-374-23196-5 (cloth), 288 pp., $25 
In its historic philosophical and psychological formulations, nativ-
ism highlighted innateness. Development was deemed nothingmore 
than a genetically driven process ofmaturation; learning, in turn, was 
nothing more than the filling in of superficial content. In this deter-
minist view, neither development nor learning could be deemed ac-
tive, creative, or constructive processes, and nothing genuinely new 
could result. 
The nativists who have increasingly populated the literature of de-
velopmental psychology since the 1980s, however, are neonativists. 
Neonativists fully accept modern views of immature organisms as 
dynamic, developing systems interacting with complex, everchang-
ing physical, social, and cultural environments. In addition to the tra-
ditional nativist focus on the role of genes, neonativism also encom-
passes a constructivist focus on the active agency of the organism and 
an empiricist focus on the active role of the environment (see also 
Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002, on “evolutionary developmental psy-
chology”). Thus, in place of a determinist view of development as ge-
netically driven maturation, neonativism is a kinder, gentler nativism 
that begins with our evolutionary heritage but goes on to incorporate 
constructivist and empiricist considerations in providing a contem-
porary developmental account. 
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Perhaps the kindest and gentlest nativism of all is the popular neo-
nativism for parents presented in two books by prominent develop-
mental researcher and theorist Alison Gopnik. The first, written with 
fellow developmentalists Andrew Meltzoff and Patricia Kuhl (Gopnik, 
Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 2001), was entitled The scientist in the crib: What 
early learning tells us about the mind. The scientist, it turned out, 
was both the developmental psychologist studying the baby and the 
baby studying everything. The notion of babies as scientists is consis-
tent with both a nativist view of early competence and a constructiv-
ist view of children as active researchers and theorists. The subtitle 
then brings in an empiricist element in its reference to early learn-
ing. But nativism predominates throughout the book: early learning 
tells us what the mind is like because it is a product of our innate ten-
dency to learn about people, about things, about language, and about 
matters in various other discrete domains for which we are innately 
prepared. We function like scientists right from the start because we 
are genetically programmed to do so. Thus, The scientist in the crib 
was neonativist in that it provided a serious role for constructivist 
and empiricist processes but incorporated these in a fundamentally 
nativist framework. 
In what may be considered a sequel, Gopnik now presents a vision 
of the baby as a philosopher. Like its predecessor, The philosophical 
baby is aimed at a general audience, especially parents, and is read-
able, informative, entertaining, and often amusing. Like its predeces-
sor, the book presents itself as passing on the latest findings from de-
velopmental psychology. It does indeed present interesting findings 
in clear and compelling ways. What will not be clear to the intended 
readers, however, is that what they are reading, rather than a consen-
sus view of the field, is a neonativist interpretation. 
Gopnik repeatedly highlights the “neo” side of neonativism in ap-
pealing to nativist, constructivist, and empiricist considerations in 
ongoing interaction, thus providing more often than not what most 
developmentalists would see as a reasonably balanced account. Early 
in the book, for example, she proceeds nimbly from a standard nativ-
ist notion of innate capacity to an inspiring overview of development 
that draws heavily on considerations associated with empiricism (es-
pecially in the first paragraph below) and constructivism (especially 
in the second): 
David  Moshman in  J  Appl  Dev  Psych  32  (2011)      3
We begin with the capacity to learn more effectively and 
more flexibly about our environment than any other species. 
This knowledge lets us imagine new environments, even rad-
ically new environments, and act to change the existing ones. 
Then we can learn about the unexpected features of the new 
environment that we have created, and so change that en-
vironment once again and so on. What neuroscientists call 
plasticity—the ability to change in the light of experience— is 
the key to human nature at every level from brains to minds 
to societies. 
Learning is a key part of the process, but the human ca-
pacity for change goes beyond just learning. Learning is 
about the way the world changes our mind, but our minds 
can also change the world. Developing a new theory about 
the world allows us to imagine other ways the world might 
be. Understanding other people and ourselves lets us imag-
ine new ways of being human. At the same time, to change 
our world, ourselves, and our society we have to think about 
what we ought to be like, as well as what we actually are like. 
This book is about how children develop minds that change 
the world. (p. 8). 
Gopnik later synthesizes constructivist, nativist, and empiricist con-
siderations more concisely: “The drive to experiment seems to be in-
nate, but experimentation provides us with a way of learning things 
that are not innate” (p. 91). Her constructivism is stated in strong 
forms: “A single unified self is something we create—not something 
we are given” (p. 17). And she performs a valuable service in caution-
ing readers that brain changes, far from being the cause of psycholog-
ical development, are often the result of experience. 
And yet, Gopnik’s nativist foundation is clear in her striking claims 
of early competence. The book begins with a description of a 1-month-
old child who “stares at her mother’s face with fixed, browwrinkling 
concentration, and suddenly produces a beatific smile” (p. 3). “Surely,” 
writes Gopnik, “she must see her mother and feel love” (p. 3). Gopnik 
later acknowledges that some stodgy old psychologists (unlike her) 
prefer the term “attachment” for what “the rest of us call love” (p. 
179). She is serious, however, about what modern science, in her view, 
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has shown: “Literally from the time they’re born children are em-
pathic. They identify with other people and recognize that their own 
feelings are shared by others” (p. 204). Further, we learn that “even 
nine-month-olds understand some important statistical ideas” (p. 83) 
and that “babies, like scientists, use statistics and experiments to learn 
about the world” (p. 16). And Gopnik leaves no doubt as to the innate 
basis of this competence: “The scientific answer” to the question of 
how we know so much about the world “is that methods of experi-
mentation and statistical analysis seem to be programmed into our 
brains even when we are tiny babies” (p. 105). In fact, as the book 
jacket gushes, “there is good reason to believe that babies are actually 
smarter, more thoughtful, and more conscious than adults.” 
But it may not take much to be smarter than adults. Even as neo-
nativists have accumulated evidence for infant competence since the 
1980s, research on adult judgment, thinking, and reasoning over the 
same period has generated a huge literature showing woeful defi-
ciencies in statistical judgment, skills of experimentation, and other 
competencies that Gopnik deems innate (Moshman, 2011; Stanov-
ich, 2004). What are we to make of this? Are we born as smart as 
we ever get? Is it downhill all the way beyond infancy? If these two 
literature are both to be believed, we start remarkably high and fall 
remarkably far. 
Gopnik hints occasionally at the possibility of development beyond 
early childhood. Babies, she acknowledges, are only “unconsciously the 
most rational beings on earth” (p. 162, emphasis added). “Very young 
children unconsciously use [experimentation and statistical analysis] 
to change their causal maps of the world” (p. 105, emphasis added). 
We must consider “the relationship between the baby’s implicit ideas 
about his particular mom and the grown-up’s much more explicit ideas 
about love in general” (p. 189). These reminders of the limited na-
ture of early competence are relatively few and subtle, however, with 
hardly a hint of how much remains to develop. A constructivist elab-
oration would put more emphasis on the implicit nature of early com-
petence, the automatic nature of early inferential processing, and the 
reflective developmental processes that render knowledge and infer-
ence increasingly (though far from totally) explicit, conscious, and 
controlled over the course of childhood and adolescence (Campbell 
& Bickhard, 1986; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Moshman, 2011; Müller, 
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Carpendale, & Smith, 2009). Adolescents and adults may be far from 
perfect, but they are far from infants. 
A constructivist elaboration might also provide a more accurate 
account of Piaget (Moshman, 2011; Müller et al., 2009), who is pre-
sented throughout the book as if his main conclusion after 60 years 
of research on children was that they are utterly incompetent and ir-
rational. This is repeatedly contrasted to the more respectful “mod-
ern” view of infants and young children as innately competent and 
rational. For example, Gopnik presents Piaget’s theory as asserting 
that “young children are limited to the here and now—their immedi-
ate sensations and perceptions and experience” (p. 20) and counters 
this view with evidence that infants of 18 months can imagine possi-
bilities and outcomes on concrete tasks where 15-month-olds are lim-
ited to trial-and-error solutions (p. 24). But her data are in fact fully 
consistent with Piaget’s own infancy data and with his detailed ac-
count of the transition from sensorimotor to representational intelli-
gence in the first 18−24 months of life. Similarly, with regard to mo-
rality, Gopnik writes, “Piaget thought that children didn’t have genuine 
moral knowledge because he thought that they couldn’t take the per-
spective of others, infer intentions, and followabstract rules” (p. 20). 
But in fact, Piaget thought children actively construct increasingly ad-
vanced competencies in all of these areas (Müller et al., 2009). Where 
Piaget differed from Gopnik is in how little he thought we know at 
birth and how much he thought we actively construct through many 
years of interaction, coordination, and reflection. Ironically, it may be 
Piaget, rather than Gopnik, whose theory most fully respects the cre-
ative rationality of the developing mind. 
But Gopnik certainly respects this, too. “The great evolutionary ad-
vantage of human beings,” she writes, “is their ability to escape from 
the constraints of evolution” (p. 7). She does not take this as far as 
some (Stanovich, 2004), but her neonativism clearly demonstrates 
that we can take evolution seriously without succumbing to genetic 
determinism. 
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